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The objective of the study was to investigate the impact of collective guilt on preferences towards resolutions in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study was conducted in four different countries: Israel (proximate in-group 
implying a higher degree of identification with Israel) and the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
(distal in-group implying a weaker identification with Israel). The participants were 240 persons representing the 
general Jewish population of Israel and the Baltic countries. This research was the attempt to employ both the 
experimental and quasi-experimental methods to examine the role of collective guilt on preferences for 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution strategies. In general, the study showed that collective guilt was facilitated by 
experimental manipulation. The greater collective guilt was provoked in groups with Israeli guilt and ambiguous 
information. Baltic respondents were more ready to accommodate and collaborate than Israeli respondents. In 
general, collective guilt and age facilitated a collaborating strategy, but the perceived legitimacy of group 
relationships and glorification predicted a competing strategy. The more one felt collective guilt, the greater the 
readiness was to cooperate. The stronger the identification with Jewish people, the less the readiness was to 
collaborate with the out-group.  
Keywords: collective guilt, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conflict resolution, in-group identification, social identity 
theory 
Introduction 
Social Identity and Collective Guilt 
It is almost impossible to imagine our lives without considering the relationships we have with the people 
who are important to us: family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, etc.. All these people form groups which 
influence our thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. We may derive our emotional reactions to others from the 
group with which we identify (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Immoral activities of an in-group may be perceived as 
harmful to one’s group identity since the human identity is based on group belongingness and the desire to 
think of one’s group positively which is often related to group exonerating strategies (Wohl, Branscombe, & 
Klar, 2006). However, when for some reasons this is not possible, people may feel collective guilt with a 
strength equivalent to the threat of in-group activities in the past, to present moral standards. People may have 
difficulties in simultaneously avoiding self-categorization as a member of a certain group and denying their 
collective responsibility. If such a strategy does not work, people start to feel collective guilt in relation to the 
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group (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Despite the fact that one may not have been involved in harming certain 
group members, pure associations with the guilty group may elicit such emotions as collective guilt (Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2005). From the moment a person starts to identify oneself with a group, he/she is less ready for 
confrontations with negative episodes involving the in-group. When a person feels less connected to the group, 
he/she is ready to recognize the negative experience. People with low identification feel relatively stronger 
collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) and dispositional attribution to the behaviour 
of their group (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). According to these findings, people with lower identification are 
more supportive of the reparation policy (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). People with a 
higher degree of identification feel superiority; therefore, they feel less collective guilt and do more external 
attributions (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003), which result in lower involvement with reparation actions (Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). 
Research at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century revealed contradictory 
results about the relationships between identification and collective guilt. For example, Doosje et al. (1998) 
first found negative connections, then a positive one, or did not find any connections at all (Branscombe, 
Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004). Under conditions of ambiguous information, people with low identification felt 
more collective guilt than did people with high identification (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004). On the 
one hand, people with high identification must have a higher moral responsibility for activities of the in-group, 
which may mean that collective guilt can be positively related to identification. On the other hand, on the basis 
of social identity theory, it has been established that people who identify more with the in-group will also be 
more motivated to maintain positive social identity; hence, they will experience a higher degree of 
confrontation with negative information about the in-group and will try to find an alternative interpretation of 
it. According to this line of reasoning, group identification facilitates the perceived legitimacy of intergroup 
relationship; hence, less guilt will be experienced regarding the group’s action. By summarizing both of these 
approaches, identification may simultaneously be related both positively and negatively to collective guilt; 
this issue is still under discussion. A recent study found a non-linear effect of identification on collective guilt 
(Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011). Respectively, it was discovered that an inverted U relationship exists 
between group identification and collective guilt—The strongest feelings of collective guilt were found for 
those with an average degree of identification. A negative correlation has been found between the degree of 
identification and recognition of the severity of harm, as well as a positive correlation between the degree of 
identification and the perceived legitimacy of intergroup actions (Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011). In addition, 
a negative effect of identification on reparation support, as well as a positive correlation between collective 
guilt and reparation support has been found. This relationship indicates two different processes: collective 
guilt serves as a function of social identity, where the social identity facilitates the feeling of guilt, while 
collective guilt endangers social identity; thus, people with higher identification use defensive reactions (Klein, 
Licata, & Pierucci, 2011). 
In order to solve the identification-guilt paradox, Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, and Eidelson (2008) 
offer a new multi-dimensional model of group identification. Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) proposed 
looking at identification as two dimensions: attachment (a combination of importance and commitment) and 
glorification mode (a combination of superiority and deference). The more people glorify their group, the 
smaller is the collective guilt which they feel. The attachment mode is positively related to collective guilt in 
the case where the glorification dimension is being controlled, which means that glorification reduces the effect 
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of attachment identification to collective guilt in general.  
National and other social groups have their own history. Reminding a group about its history can affect 
current emotional reactions considerably. When people think about different aspects of their group’s history, 
they may feel collective pride; in turn, there are some aspects of group history which can cause collective 
guilt and a wish to minimize the harm. Such emotional reactions are increased, not by personal involvement 
in these situations, but by a categorization of the personal I as a part of the group. “Collective guilt is a 
group-based guilt”, which could be conceptualized as guilt that is experienced as a consequence of belonging 
to a group that has done something that is perceived as illegitimate (Doosje et al., 2006, p. 326). In general, 
four main processes in the course of the emergence of collective guilt are under discussion: 
self-categorization with a group that has harmed another group, an acceptance of group responsibility for the 
harm, recognition of illegitimate activity, and harm reparation efforts (Wohl et al., 2006). People 
self-categorize as members of a group, which has caused harm to another group. Group members take group 
responsibility for activities which caused harm to another group. Group members recognize the illegitimacy 
of the group activities. The size of the collective guilt will depend on the harm reparation “expenses” or costs 
of such efforts. From the perspective of social identity theory, an increase in the significance of the group 
enlarges the possibility that the individual will experience emotions coming from belonging to the group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People are protective of their in-group image: in-group members may try to 
minimize or deny the responsibility of their group for the harm, or they can admit it as legitimate (Wohl et al., 
2006). Another possibility for reducing collective guilt is the mechanism of exonerating cognitions (Roccas, 
Klar, & Liviatan, 2004).  
Negative information about the in-group’s past endangers group morality; consequently, people with 
high identification will do everything to deny such information. Based on the information source, people 
make a decision about the credibility of the information. Doosje et al. (2006) investigated the effect of 
information sources and national identification on collective guilt. They found that in cases when the 
information was presented by an out-group, participants felt less collective guilt; whereas, when the 
information was presented by the in-group, participants had difficulties in denying it, which resulted in 
higher collective guilt. The linking of this cognition with the level of identification shows that with high 
identification, people are more affected when the source is the in-group and consequently feel more 
collective guilt.  
The Israel-Palestine Conflict 
The Israel-Palestine conflict has been widely researched in the context of different factors: collective 
emotions, matters of identification, socio-demographic variables, etc.. Most studies on resolutions of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict are correlative; and only a small part is composed of research of an experimental 
design (Maoz, 2009; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). It has been found that resistance to compromise is best 
predicted by social confidence about the zero-sum nature of the conflict and the perceived threat from the 
Palestinian side. Meanwhile, readiness for compromise is positively related to sympathy for the Palestinians, 
which, in turn, is not connected to fear of them (Maoz & McCauley, 2005). Another explanation is linked to the 
attribution of illegitimacy to the Palestinians. Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, and Drori (2008) found that 
attribution of illegitimacy to the Palestinians is negatively related to hope and optimism in respect to conflict 
resolution. Dehumanization of the Palestinians facilitates aggressive activities by the Israelis (Maoz & 
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McCauley, 2008). A large part of the research is devoted to the influence of the in-group victim role on forms 
of conflict resolution. Research of different groups discloses the following: Trust of the in-group victim role is 
connected to low receptiveness to new information about the conflict and low support for compromise (Bar-Tal, 
Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). People, who believed that Israel bore the role of a victim, believed 
more in only the Jewish people having the right to Israel’s territories, were more supportive of dehumanizing 
ideas about Arabs and Palestinians; they ascribed the guilt for the length and failures of the conflict to the 
out-group; they felt a deeper hate of the out-group and, consequently, gave less support to compromise. People 
who were more accepting of the role of victim felt less guilt for the causes, were less ready to assume group 
liability and were less ready to compensate the harm caused to Palestinians. In addition, such people applied 
exonerating cognitions (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). Trust in the vulnerability of the in-group facilitated aggressive 
behaviour and less searching for compromises (Maoz & Eidelson, 2007). A recent study disclosed that trust in 
the in-group victim role is related to a wish to offend Palestinians and negatively related with collective guilt 
(Schori, Klar, & Roccas, 2009).  
Some of the studies have been devoted to the effect of emotions on conflict resolution. A recent study by 
Halperin (2011) reveals that fear facilitates destructive methods of conflict resolution. People with stronger fear 
emotions, were less ready to support a compromising strategy because of the lack of security. Israeli 
respondents experiencing hate gave much stronger support to activities related to aggression by Israel and 
weaker support for compromise (Halperin, 2008).  
The present study was designed in a way that it integrated both experimental manipulations of guilt, as 
well as quasi-experimental differences in identification—Our participants were from Israel (proximate in-group 
implying a higher degree of identification with Israel) and Baltic countries (distal in-group implying a weaker 
identification with Israel). “Diaspora” Jews probably identify themselves as Jews but not as “Israelis”. In 
addition to differences in level and mode of identification with Israel, there are also real differences in terms 
both of responsibility for and consequences of particular resolution strategies. The proximate in-group (Israeli 
Jews) has much more direct influence on past, present and future policy-making than the distal in-group (Baltic 
Jews). That is also the reason why we suggested, that Israeli Jews would be more risk-averse in their choices 
and employ defensive coping strategies when they would be adversely affected in ways that the Baltic Jews 
would not. We expected to determine the impact of collective guilt on preferences for Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict resolution strategies. We tested two hypotheses: 
(1) That collective guilt would facilitate a readiness to support a collaborative strategy of conflict 
resolution; 
(2) Baltic Jews (distal in-group) would identify with Israel less than the Israelis Jews (proximate in-group) 
would; as a result, they would feel a stronger collective guilt and would be ready to choose a collaborative 
strategy to a greater extent. 
Method 
The study was a 2 (country) × 4 (collective guilt manipulation) quasi-experiment. The country (expected 
to manifest a high and low identification of the participants with Israel) served as a quasi-experimental factor. 
Collective guilt (high/low) was manipulated by offering different facts about the Israel-Palestine conflict to 
participants to read that indicate the guilt of one or other party. To determine the level of identification and 
collective guilt, respondents filled in two questionnaires. In addition to collective guilt, the readiness to accept 
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group responsibility, the perceived legitimacy of the group relationship, and the exonerating cognitions were 
measured. Conflict resolution strategy (the dependent variable) was measured by a list of feasible solutions to 
the Israel-Palestine conflict. In addition, questions were asked about readiness for social contact with the 
out-group (Palestinians).  
The quasi-experiment involved participants from four countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Israel. 
Jewish people with their own attitudes and preferences with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict live in each 
of these countries. Studies with a similar scope of interest were performed mainly in one country only, in Israel. 
We treated the study sample as a set of two sub-samples: one from the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia) and another from Israel. The participants were recruited from schools, universities, and Jewish 
communities. The quasi-experiment was completely computerized.  
Participants 
There were 240 Jewish respondents of both genders in the age range from 15 to 36 years with a mean age 
of 22.8 (SD = 5.06) taking part in the quasi-experiment. The mean age of Baltic participants was 22.2 (SD = 
4.72), and the mean age of Israel respondents was 23.3 (SD = 5.34). There was no difference in age between the 
respondents t(238) = -1.67, p > 0.05. Each sub-sample contained 69 women and 51 men. Six participants from 
the Baltic countries described themselves as atheists, and 114—as followers of Judaism, while four participants 
in Israel described themselves as atheists, and 116—as followers of Judaism. The results of the χ2 test, showed 
no differences in the religion between the subsamples (χ2(1, N = 240) = 0.42, p > 0.05). However, there were 
differences in importance attached to religion in Israel (M = 3.40, SD = 1.49) vs. the Baltic countries (M = 2.97, 
SD = 1.18), t(238) = -2.50, p < 0.05. These results suggest that Israeli respondents are more attached to religion 
than Baltic respondents. 
An independent-sample t-test was conducted to compare gender differences. There were some gender 
differences stated; respectively, there were statistically significant differences between men (M = 2.54, SD = 
1.30) and women (M = 2.94, SD = 1.40) in collective guilt t(238) = 2.30, p < 0.05 and a statistically significant 
difference between men (M = 2.96, SD = 1.39) and women (M = 3.35 , SD = 1.32) in the importance of religion 
t(238) = 2.20, p < 0.05. In general, women felt collective guilt more and attached more importance to religion.  
In each sub-sample, four randomized groups were formed. Each group had a different manipulation of 
guilt: Israeli guilt, Palestinian guilt, ambiguous guilt, and neutral information. Respectively, the first three 
groups had a collective guilt manipulation while the fourth served as a control group. Each experimental group 
consisted of 30 persons. 
Measurements and Procedure 
Two items of identification with Israel (“Israel is important state for me”, α = 0.75) and two items of 
Jewish people’s identification (“Jewish people are an important group for me”, α = 0.85), together four 
statements from the “Identification scale with the Dutch” (Doosje et al., 2006) were used in the current research. 
Four modes of attachment (“I am strongly committed to Israel”, α = 0.79) and four modes of glorification 
(“Other nations can learn a lot from Israel”, α = 0.74), together eight statements from the “Measure of 
identification with Israel” (Roccas et al., 2006) were used. Respectively, 12 statements were established in total 
for the measurement of identification with the in-group. Agreements with the statements ranged from 1 
(“Disagree completely”) to 7 (“Completely agree”). 
The research lasted four months (from January to April). Two assistants organized the quasi-experiment in 
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Israel. The research was performed in two languages: Russian (in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Hebrew 
in Israel. To ensure the comparability of Russian and Hebrew experiment versions, pilot researches were 
conducted; no differences were found in translations. The Russian language was native language for Baltic 
Jews, the Hebrew was native language for Israeli Jews. First, the quasi-experiment was carried out in the Baltic 
countries; afterwards the Israeli sample was formed by matching age and gender. The quasi-experiment was 
completely computerized. The quasi-experiment was performed in a frontal mode; respectively, 2-7 people 
participated simultaneously. Each participant sat at computer; the process had no time limit. In the first stage of 
the study, the participants were asked to rate their level of identification. After that, each participant was 
randomly provided some experimental manipulation (reading facts about Israel’s guilt, Palestinian guilt, 
ambiguous guilt or neutral information). After this, a manipulation check was provided: The respondents filled 
in the statements on collective guilt, in-group responsibility, perceived legitimacy of the group relationship and 
exonerating cognitions. And finally respondents rated 14 different conflict resolutions and readiness for social 
contact with the out-group. At the end of the quasi-experiment, participants were asked to answer questions 
about their gender, age, city of residence, occupation, study program (in the case of students), religious 
adherence, and the importance of religion to them. The participants were also provided with a debriefing at the 
end of the research.  
Dependent Variables 
The degree to which collective guilt was accepted by participants was assessed by four statements (“I feel 
guilty when I think about Israel’s policy towards Palestinians”, α = 0.87). These items were used from 
“Collective guilt measurement” (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). In addition, two statements about in-group 
responsibility (“Israel assumes the key responsibility for consequences from the conflict with Palestinians”, α = 
0.86) were used (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Two additional statements about the perceived legitimacy of 
group relationship (“Palestinian terrorism made Israel defend itself using its armed forces”, α = 0.51) were 
measured (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). We also measured exonerating cognitions by two statements (“I think 
that information reflected in the previous slide is too negative in respect to Israel”, α = 0.83) (Roccas et al., 
2006). Ratings were made from 1 (“Disagree completely”) to 7 (“Completely agree”).  
For an evaluation of the conflict resolution strategies, participants assessed every resolution from a given 
list on a scale from -3 (“Completely against”) to 3 (“Support completely”). The list consisted of 14 possible 
resolutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Four resolutions measured collaboration (“Organize peace 
negotiations”, α = 0.76), three measured competition (“Jerusalem and other places belong only to Israel”, α = 
0.73), three measured avoidance (“Develop relationships with other countries and not deal with 
Israel-Palestinian conflict”, α = 0.61), and four measured accommodation (“Israel provides some part of 
Jerusalem to Palestine”, α = 0.74).  
A Bogardus-type scale was used to measure readiness for out-group social contact. Participants had to 
respectively assess the level of their readiness for involvement in contact with Palestinians. Respondents were 
asked: “How willing would you be to have each of the following contacts with a Palestinian”. Respondents 
replied on a 5-point scale anchored by 1 (“Not at all willing”) and 5 (“Definitely willing”) (Y. Bar-Tal, D. 
Bar-Tal, & Cohen-Hendeles, 2006; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). Seven items described different types of contact, 
for example, “living in the same neighborhood”. Responses to the seven items were averaged as an overall 
index of readiness for contact. The internal reliability of this index was 0.92.  
COLLECTIVE GUILT MAKES CONFLICTING PARTIES MORE COLLABORATIVE 277
Results 
We expected to determine the impact of collective guilt on preferences for Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
resolution strategies. Two hypotheses were assessed during the research: 
(1) That collective guilt would facilitate a readiness to support a collaborative strategy of conflict 
resolution; 
(2) Baltic Jews (distal in-group) would identify with Israel less than the Israelis Jews (proximate in-group) 
would; as a result, they would feel a stronger collective guilt and would be ready to choose a collaborative 
strategy to a greater extent. 
Impact of Independent Variables 
An independent-sample t-test was conducted to compare identification with Israel. There was a significant 
difference in the score of identification with Israel between Baltic (M = 5.24, SD = 1.26) and Israeli 
respondents (M = 6.50, SD = 0.70), t(238) = -9.65, p < 0.001. There was a significant difference in the score of 
the identification attachment mode between Baltic (M = 4.93, SD = 1.14) and Israeli respondents (M = 6.20, SD 
= 0.84), t(238) = -9.86, p < 0.001. Respectively, Israeli respondents had a higher identification with the country 
as well as a higher attachment to Israel.  
In order to test experimental manipulation, we performed a 2 (country) × 4 (type of collective guilt 
manipulation) ANOVA on the measure of collective guilt, in-group responsibility, exonerating cognitions 
and in-group legitimacy. Irrespective of the country (F < 1, n.s.), there were differences between 
experimental groups in collective guilt, F(3, 232) = 21.95, p < 0.001, and a post-hoc analysis Bonferroni test (p 
< 0.05) revealed that a higher collective guilt was raised in the Israeli guilt group and in the group with 
ambiguous information (see Table 1 for the results). There were statistically significant differences between 
experimental groups in the in-group responsibility measurement F(3, 232) = 8.94, p < 0.001, and a post-hoc 
analysis Bonferroni test (p < 0.05) revealed that a higher in-group responsibility was raised in the Israeli guilt 
group and in the group with ambiguous information (see Table 1 for the results). There were also differences 
between countries as well (F(1, 232) = 7.39, p < 0.01). Baltic respondents (M = 2.47, SD = 1.26) were, in 
general, more ready to assign responsibility to Israel than Israel respondents were (M = 2.02, SD = 1.40). 
There were also differences between experimental groups in the measurement of the exonerating cognitions 
F(3, 232) = 46.09, p < 0.001, and a post-hoc analysis Bonferroni test (p < 0.05) revealed that higher exonerating 
cognitions were raised in the Israeli guilt group and in the group with ambiguous information (see Table 1 
for the results). The ANOVA also showed that experimental manipulation or the country, or interaction of 
the factors had no effects on in-group legitimacy (F < 1, n.s.). No interaction effects were found to be 
significant.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
In order to test the hypotheses we regressed conflict resolution strategies one by one on a set of predictor 
variables: experimental manipulation (coded as a dummy variable—respective experimental manipulation was 
coded 1 against the control group coded as 0), identification with Israel, identification with Jewish people, 
modes of attachment and glorification, collective guilt, in-group responsibility, in-group legitimacy, 
exonerating cognitions, gender, age, importance of religion, and country of the participants. Results of all the 
regressions are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables of the Study 
 
Israeli guilt  Palestinian guilt Ambiguous information  Control group 
Baltic M(SD) Israel M(SD)  Baltic M(SD) Israel M(SD) Baltic M(SD) Israel M(SD)  Baltic M(SD) Israel M(SD) 
Identification 
Identification 
with 
Israel (2) 
5.68 (1.23)*** 6.63 (0.64)***  4.92 (1.47)*** 6.53 (0.63)*** 5.08 (1.01)*** 6.27 (0.90)***  5.27 (1.21)*** 6.58 (0.56)*** 
Identification 
with 
Jewish people (2) 
6.38 (1.06) 6.10 (1.12)  5.82 (1.48) 5.92 (1.58) 6.07 (1.12) 5.62 (1.52)  5.58 (1.73) 8.28 (1.28) 
Mode of 
attachment (4) 4.95 (1.10)
*** 6.30 (0.74)***  4.91 (1.31)*** 6.23 (0.90)*** 4.97 (0.91)*** 6.00 (1.01)***   4.89 (1.25)*** 6.29 (0.70)*** 
Mode of 
glorification (4) 5.31 (1.05) 5.07 (1.30)  5.30 (1.16) 5.26 (0.87) 5.16 (0.88) 4.71 (1.19)  5.54 (0.98) 5.32 (1.13) 
Experimental 
manipulation  
Collective guilt 
(4) 3.52 (1.61)
a 3.57 (1.53)a  2.16 (0.63)b 2.39 (1.04)b 3.22 (1.43)a 3.29 (1.55)a  1.95 (0.65)b 2.08 (0.86)b 
In-group 
responsibility (2) 3.15 (1.42)
*,a 2.18 (1.63)*  2.12 (0.88)c 1.95 (1.40) 2.87 (1.43)a,c 2.38 (1.56)  1.73 (0.60)b 1.57 (0.81) 
In-group 
legitimacy (2) 5.80 (0.96) 5.57 (1.32)  5.18 (1.43)
** 6.07 (1.03)** 5.45 (1.08) 5.40 (1.26)  5.48 (1.21) 5.53 (1.20) 
Exonerating 
cognitions (2) 5.17 (1.44)
 a 5.42 (1.34) a  3.69 (1.56)b 3.32 (2.14)b 4.30 (1.01)a,b 4.23 (1.94) a,b  2.20 (1.18)c 1.92 (1.52)c 
Conflict 
resolutions 
Collaborating (4) 1.31 (1.08)*** -0.11 (1.29)***  1.10 (1.08)*** 0.04 (1.31)*** 0.94 (1.17)** -0.02 (1.39)**  1.13 (1.25)** 0.20 (1.35)** 
Accommodating 
(4) -0.71 (0.98)
** -1.56 (1.34)**  -0.86 (1.09)* -1.63 (1.33)* -1.00 (1.15) -1.21 (1.71)  -1.03 (1.22)** -2.05 (1.19)** 
Competing (3) -0.53 (1.33) -0.32 (1.85)  -0.09 (1.48) -0.34 (1.73) -0.10 (1.54) -0.42 (1.85)  0.01 (1.51) -0.24 (1.56) 
Avoiding (3) 0.06 (1.22)* -0.81 (1.47)*, a  -0.19 (1.36) -0.20 (1.44) a,b 0.11 (1.31) 0.18 (1.12) b  0.13 (1.30) -0.19 (1.22) a,b 
Readiness for 
social 
contact with 
out-group 
7 statements 2.55 (0.93) 2.42 (1.10)  2.35 (0.79) 2.31 (1.03) 2.53 (1.02) 2.15 (1.11)  2.63 (0.70) 2.30 (1.06) 
Notes. *(p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001); a, b,c Means that share the same superscripts does not differ at p > 0.05 in 
compliance with Bonferroni Post-Hoc test results. 
 
Table 2 
Regression Predicting Conflict Resolutions and Readiness for Social Contact With Out-Group  
Independent measures 
Dependent variables 
Collaborating a  Accommodating b Competing c Avoiding d  Readiness for social contact with out-group e 
B  β  B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β  B SE B β 
Identification with Israel                   
Identification with  
Jewish people -0.12 0.06 -0.13
*               
Mode of attachment                   
Mode of glorification     -0.15 0.08 -0.13* 0.41 0.09 0.28***        
Collective guilt 0.23 0.06 0.23***     -0.22 0.08 -0.19**     0.20 0.05 0.28*** 
In-group responsibility     0.37 0.06 0.37***           
In-group legitimacy     -0.17 0.07 -0.16** 0.25 0.09 0.19**     -0.24 0.05 -0.29*** 
Exonerating cognitions -0.10 0.04 -0.15*               
Gender                  
Age 0.03 0.02 0.13*               
Importance of religion               -0.10 0.04 -0.15* 
Country -1.17 0.15 -0.43***  -0.43 0.17 -0.17*           
Israeli guilt                  
Palestinian guilt                  
Ambiguous information               -0.27 0.13 -0.12* 
Notes. Regressions were conducted applying stepwise (forward) method; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; a F(5,239) = 17.17, p < 
0.001, R2 = 0.27, b F(4,239) = 24.71, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.39, c F(3,239) = 27.15, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.26, d F(4,239) < 1, n.s., e F(4,239) = 23.95, p 
< 0.001, R2 = 0.29.  
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As we can see in the case of collaborating identification with Jewish people, exonerating cognitions 
predict it negatively, while collective guilt and participants’ age positively. Baltic participants too were more 
positive towards collaborating than their Israeli counterparts. Accommodating strategy was negatively 
predicted by the mode of glorification and the perceived in-group legitimacy, while positively by the perceived 
in-group responsibility. In this case too, Baltic participants were more prone to suggest this strategy in 
comparison with Israeli participants. A competing strategy was negatively predicted by perceived collective 
guilt, but positively by the mode of glorification and the perceived in-group legitimacy. Regression of the 
avoiding strategy did not yield any statistically significant results. We also regressed the readiness for social 
contact with the out-group on the same set of variables as for the conflict resolution strategies. For this analysis 
we found that the perceived in-group legitimacy, importance of religion, and experimental manipulation of 
ambiguous information were negative predictors, while the perceived collective guilt was a positive predictor.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Results of the quasi-experiment show that the hypothesis that collective guilt facilitates a readiness to 
support a collaborative strategy was partially confirmed. Respectively, the collective guilt predicts a 
collaborative strategy in general; however, the experimental manipulation of collective guilt alone did not 
succeed in promoting choice of a collaborative strategy. To some extent these findings are in line with other 
studies showing that collective guilt facilitates compensation (Sharvit, Halperin, & Rosler, 2011) and promotes 
motivation for averting the harm caused by the in-group (Doosje et al., 1998). Another hypothesis “Baltic Jews 
(distal in-group) would identify with Israel less than the Israelis Jews (proximate in-group) would; as a result, 
they would feel a stronger collective guilt and would be ready to choose a collaborative strategy to a greater 
extent” was also partially confirmed. Respectively, Israeli Jews had a higher identification with the country of 
Israel as well as a higher attachment mode to Israel than Jewish people from the Baltic countries; however, 
participants from both countries had roughly the same level of collective guilt. Simultaneously, Baltic 
respondents are more supportive of a collaborative strategy than Israeli respondents are. One of the 
explanations is the construal level theory and its effect on social judgments (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Negotiators located in different places are able to find a better solution than under a condition of reduced 
distance between them (Henderson, 2010). Respectively, the ones living near the conflict area are operating 
with more detailed information than are people living far away from the conflict zone; thus, finding a complete 
compromise might be more complicated. Consequently, Jewish people living far away from the conflict area 
are more tended towards negotiations with the opponents. One more explanation is that in addition to 
differences in level and mode of identification with Israel there are real differences between Baltic and Israeli 
Jews in terms both of the responsibility for and consequences of particular resolution strategies. The proximate 
in-group (Israeli Jews) has more direct influence on past, present and future policy-making than the distal 
in-group (Baltic Jews), and different implications for collective guilt could be demonstrated. It would be quite 
natural for Israeli Jews to be more risk-averse in their choices and employ defensive coping strategies when 
they would be adversely affected in ways that the Baltic Jews would not. Another explanation is related to the 
fact that people involved in conflict are more accepting of the role of victim (Branscombe, 2004); thus, Israeli 
participants are less ready for a positive solution to the problem than are Jewish people living outside the 
conflict area. Similar studies have disclosed that trust in the in-group victim role is related to a low 
receptiveness to new information about the conflict and low support for compromises (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). 
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People believing in the victim role of Israel had a greater belief that Jewish people have a right to Israeli 
territories, were more supportive of dehumanizing ideas about Arabs and Palestinians, attributed the fault for 
the length of the conflict and failures to the out-group, felt stronger hate towards the out-group, and, 
consequently, were less supportive of compromise. This might be one of the explanations for the fact that the 
people in the conflict area resistant to positive collaboration.  
An important finding is related to the identification measurement: Israeli Jews have a higher identification 
with the country of Israel as well as a higher attachment dimension to Israel than have Baltic respondents. This 
tendency showed up in all experimental groups. It coincides logically with the idea that people identify 
themselves more with the country in which they are living. This was exactly predicted in the planning of the 
present study. Measures of the experimental manipulations showed that the highest collective guilt was 
provoked in the Israeli guilt group and in the group with ambiguous information in both countries. In general, 
Israeli and Baltic participants feel collective guilt at the same level. Baltic participants are in general more 
ready to assign group responsibility to Israel than Israeli Jews. In groups where collective guilt was provoked 
the most (Israeli guilt group and the ambiguous information group), group responsibility’s assignment was also 
provoked more. Nevertheless, theoretical speculation proves that the in-group can use several mechanisms to 
protect itself: People may not admit responsibility or declare the damage as legal (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 
2006). It is possible that, when reading negative information about their in-group, Israeli participants were 
blaming Palestinians for their misfortune and were trying to excuse their own behaviour. Consequently, people 
from a group with a higher degree of identification were more resistant to admitting group responsibility, while 
people from a group with a lower degree of identification were more flexible in the recognition of their 
in-group’s failures.  
Higher in-group responsibility’s assignment was observed in the Israeli guilt group and the ambiguous 
information group. Stronger exonerating cognitions are observed in the Israeli guilt group and in the ambiguous 
information group. Consequently, an increase in collective guilt made the admission of group responsibility 
more and more annoying and people began to look for exonerating strategies (Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011). 
This is why higher collective guilt and higher exonerating cognition scores were stated in the Israeli guilt group 
and in the ambiguous information group. Baltic and Israeli respondents use exonerating cognitions of 
approximately the same level. The in-group legitimacy parameter of the Baltic and Israel respondents was 
approximately at the same level in all experimental groups. It is possible that the ambiguous information 
reflects the most precise reality about the suffering of both parties and the mutual responsibility of both parties 
for the continuation of the conflict; therefore, a higher collective guilt and a lower parameter of in-group 
legitimacy was stated in this group. 
The regression analyses showed that experimental manipulation on its own does not affect the preference 
for any of the four conflict strategies. At the same time, it was discovered that the country influences the 
accommodating and the collaborative strategy. It means that Baltic respondents were more ready for 
accommodation and cooperation than were Israeli respondents across all experimental groups. It coincides with 
findings stating that persons with a lower level of identification are ready for cooperation to a higher extent, as 
well as being more ready to admit group responsibility than are persons with a high degree of identification 
(Doosje et al., 1998). Baltic and Israeli participants supported both the competing and the avoiding strategies 
similarly. In general, Baltic participants were ready to support a collaborative strategy in all experimental 
groups to a higher extent than were Israeli respondents. In addition, the results obtained confirmed that people 
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with a higher degree of identification (in this study the Israelis) are more ready to resist negative information 
than are people with a lower identification with the in-group (in this study the Baltic participants), and 
consequently, were less ready to be involved in reparation actions (Doosje et al., 1998). People tend to protect 
the image of their in-group- they can minimize or deny the responsibility of their group for the damage they 
have caused, or they can acknowledge it as legal (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006).  
The quasi-experiment disclosed that in-group responsibility positively predicts the accommodating 
strategy. It means the following: The more respondents are ready to assign responsibility to in-group, the more 
they are ready to accommodate in the conflict. Meanwhile, in-group legitimacy, the country, and the 
glorification dimension predict a readiness to accommodate negatively. Namely, the more people support 
in-group legitimacy, the less they are ready to accommodate. Israeli respondents are, in general, less ready for 
accommodation. Collective guilt predicts a readiness for competing negatively, which in turn means that in the 
case of a higher collective guilt, there will be less support for a strategy of competing. The glorification strategy 
and in-group legitimacy predicted a competing strategy positively. It means the following: The higher one 
scores on the glorification dimension, and the more one supports in-group legitimacy, the more he/she will be 
ready to use the strategy of competition. Previous studies have found that the glorification dimension reduces 
the demand for justice through moral recovery; thus, the glorification dimension does not permit acceptance of 
critical information about in-group behaviour (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010); consequently, 
it may lead to destructive resolutions of the conflict. This research also supported the fact, that different 
identification modes could predict conflict resolution strategies. It is another substantiation for the 
multidimensional concept of identification (Roccas et al., 2008), which can be more efficiently observed by the 
application of several dimensions. Strong identification with the in-group increases hostility to the out-group 
and reduces the ability of in-group participants to see the demands of the other party as legitimate (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989).  
Collective guilt and age predict support for a collaborative strategy positively. It means that, by age, 
people are tended more towards cooperation; in addition, the stronger the collective guilt, the more people are 
ready to support a collaborative strategy. Meanwhile, the country, the exonerating cognitions, and the 
identification with Jewish people predict a collaborative strategy negatively. In general, Baltic respondents 
support cooperation more; and the more respondents exonerated behaviour and the higher the identification 
with Jewish people, the less the participants were cooperation-oriented. It coincides with other studies, which 
have found that exonerating cognitions are related to the overall tendency to minimize the consequences of 
harm created by the in-group behaviour (Roccas et al., 2004).  
Collective guilt was positively related to the readiness to engage in social contacts with Palestinians, 
which means that the more the collective guilt is admitted, the more ready people will be to engage in contacts 
with the out-group. The in-group legitimacy and the importance of religion negatively predicted the 
involvement in social contacts with the out-group. Namely, the more participants supported the legitimacy of 
the in-group and the more importance they attached to religion, the less ready they were to engage in contacts 
with the out-group. Similar findings are coming from other studies as well; it was found that, in general, 
orthodox Jewish people have a lower tendency to support the peace plan than non-religious Jewish people 
(Richman & Nolle, 2011). It means that the importance of religion in life can block a readiness to involve in 
contacts with an out-group. Another recent study disclosed that religious Jewish people are less supportive of 
the peace plan (Moore & Aweiss, 2002); and, the less they support the peace plan, the stronger is their hate 
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towards the out-group. Also, a stronger hate of the out-group was present in religious participants with a high 
importance for the safety issue and Jewish identity (Moore & Aweiss, 2002).  
The results of the present study coincide with ideas underlining that the admission of damage is often 
accompanied by a wish to redeem guilt, like asking for forgiveness, or financial compensation (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). This research showed, that the groups in which collective guilt was higher, did 
not choose cooperation strategies to a higher extent; however, collective guilt predicts a collaborative strategy 
and the readiness to involve in social contacts with the out-group positively, while the competing strategy is 
predicted negatively. Based on theoretical and practical findings, it can be stated that collective guilt facilitates 
a motivation to diminish the harm caused by the in-group to participants of the out-group.  
The results of the present experiment supplement the range of experiments on the effect of collective guilt 
on conflict resolutions. The hypothesis of the study was partially proven to be true: that collective guilt predicts 
a collaborative strategy positively. At the same time, groups with a higher level of collective guilt supported a 
collaborative strategy on the same level as did groups with lower collective guilt. Baltic Jews were in general 
more ready for an accommodating strategy as well as more supportive of a collaborative strategy than were 
Israeli respondents. Respondents from Israel had higher scores in identification with Israel and in identification 
attachment mode. Exonerating cognitions and identification with Jewish people predicted a collaborative 
strategy negatively while glorification and in-group legitimacy predicted a competing strategy positively. 
Collective guilt predicts a collaborative strategy and a readiness to involve in social contacts with Palestinians 
positively and simultaneously predicts a competing strategy negatively. These results are similar to others, 
which showed that collective guilt positively correlates with a compromise strategy (Maoz & McCauley, 2005). 
One of the research limitations is the number of respondents, it would be interesting to take more 
representative random samples and extend the diversity of the sample. One of the possible future direction is to 
evaluate the collective guilt and other collective emotions on conflict resolutions preferences based on different 
distal in-groups’ family ties within Israel (how many relative living in Israel etc.). It would be interesting to 
continue the research topic, investigating more personal and collective responsibility and guilt. Being aware of 
the present study’s findings, several mechanisms affecting our assessment of conflicts become obvious. These 
findings are not limited only to the Israel-Palestine conflict; they may help us to understand other conflicts from 
the past, as well as other modern conflicts. By applying the findings of the present study, it becomes clear that 
manipulations with collective guilt can change human preferences for conflict resolutions. Especially, people 
with a high identification with the country (Israel) feel a necessity for updated information reflecting both 
in-group guilt and out-group guilt (ambiguous information) because it provides for the possibility of increasing 
collective guilt and reducing the perceived legitimacy of the in-group relationship. These findings can be 
applied in the media industry, displaying information about this conflict every day, as well as by planning 
common exchange programs between Jewish people and Palestinians. Since there are demographic differences, 
the necessity of working with people having a high identification and attaching more importance to religion is 
evident. It is recommended that people from different countries be included in such special training groups in 
order to provide them with the possibility of sharing their experience and exchanging their ideas for a better 
solution of this conflict.  
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